Na integra, em inglês, a resposta que Bento XVI deu ao matematico Piergiorgio Odifreddi.
Distinguished Professor Odifreddi,
First, I must apologize for the fact that I am only thanking you today for sending me your book, Caro Papa, ti scrivo,
and for the kind words which you addressed to me at the time through
Archbishop Gänswein. However I did not wish to write before having read
your book, and since various tasks still weigh upon me, I have finished
reading it only now.
Today, therefore, I would at last like to thank you for having sought
in great detail to confront my book, and thus also my faith. This in
large part was precisely what I intended in my address to the Roman
Curia at Christmas 2009. I must also thank you for the faithful manner
in which you dealt with my text, earnestly seeking to do it justice.
My opinion of your book as a whole, however, is rather mixed. I read
some parts of it with enjoyment and profit. In other parts, however, I
was surprised by a certain aggressiveness and rashness of argumentation.
I would like to respond chapter by chapter, but unfortunately I do not
have sufficient strength for this. I shall therefore choose a few points
that I think are particularly important.
I.
First, I marvel that on pages 25 and following you interpret my choice
to go beyond the perception of the senses in order to perceive reality
in its grandeur as “an explicit denial of the principle of reality” or
as “mystical psychosis.” In fact, I intended to maintain precisely the
position you yourself expound on page 29 and following concerning the
method of the natural sciences “which transcends the limitations of the
human senses.”
Thus I fully agree with what you write on page 40: “...mathematics has a
deep affinity with religion.” On this point, then, I see no real
contrast between your approach and mine. If on page 49 you explain that
“true religiosity ... today is to be found more in science than in
philosophy,” you are making a statement which is certainly open to
discussion; however, I am glad that you intend to present your work here
as “true religiosity.” Here, as again on page 65, and then again in the
chapter entitled “His Creed and mine,” you emphasize that true
religiosity would be constituted by the renunciation of the
“anthropomorphism” of a God understood as a person, and by the
veneration of rationality. Accordingly, on page 182 of your book, you
quite drastically say that “math and science are the only true religion,
the rest is superstition.”
Now, I can certainly understand that you consider the conception of the
primordial and creative Reason as a Person with its own “I” to be an
anthropomorphism; this seems to be a reduction of the grandeur, for us
inconceivable, of the Logos. The Trinitarian faith of the Church whose
presentation in my book you recount objectively, to some extent also
expresses the totally different, mysterious aspect of God, that which we
may intuit only from afar. Here I would like to recall the statement of
Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, as he is called, who once said that
philosophical minds certainly experience a kind of revulsion before
biblical anthropomorphisms since they consider them inadequate.
However, these enlightened persons run the risk of taking their own
philosophical conceptions of God as adequate and of forgetting that
their own philosophical ideas are also infinitely far from the reality
of the “totally Other.” Thus these anthropomorphisms are needed in order
to overcome the arrogance of thought; indeed, it must be said that, in
some respects, anthropomorphism more closely approaches the reality of
God than mere concepts. Moreover, what the Fourth Lateran Council said
in 1215 still applies, i.e. that every concept of God can only be
analogical and that dissimilarity with the true God is always infinitely
greater than likeness.
That said, it must still be maintained that a divine Logos also must be
conscious and, in this sense, a Subject and a Person. An objective
reason always presupposes a subject, a reason which is conscious of
itself.
On page 53 of your book you say that this distinction, which in 1968
could
still seem justified, is no longer tenable faced with today’s
reality of artificial intelligence. On this point you do not convince me
at all. Artificial intelligence, in fact, is obviously an intelligence
transmitted by conscious subjects, an intelligence placed in equipment.
It has a clear origin, in fact, in the intelligence of the human
creators of such equipment.
Lastly, I cannot follow you at all, if from the start you do not write Logos with a capital ‘L’ but rather the mathematical logos in lower case (page 85). The Logos that stands at the beginning of all things is a Logos above all logoi.
Of course, the transition from the logoi to the Logos
made by the Christian faith together with the great Greek philosophers
is a leap that cannot be simply demonstrated: It leads from empiricism
to metaphysics and with this to another level of thought and reality.
But this leap is at least as logical as your dispute against it. I also
think that whoever cannot make this leap should yet regard it as a
serious question. This is the crucial point in my conversation with you,
a point to which I will return again at the end. In any case, I expect
someone who seriously wonders to acknowledge that “perhaps” which,
following Martin Buber, I spoke about at the beginning of my book. Both
parties to the discussion should continue their search. It seems to me,
however, that you interrupt the quest in a dogmatic way and no longer
ask, but rather claim to teach me.
II.
The point just set forth constitutes for me the central point of a true
dialogue between your “scientific” faith and the faith of Christians.
All the rest is secondary by comparison. So you will allow me to be more
concise with regard to evolution. First I would like to point out that
no serious theologian will dispute that the entire “tree of life” is in a
living internal relationship, which the word evolution fittingly
describes. Likewise, no serious theologian will be of the opinion that
God, the Creator, repeatedly at intermediate levels had to intervene
almost manually in the process of development. In this sense, many
attacks on theology regarding evolution are unfounded. However, it would
be useful for the advancement of knowledge if those who represent the
natural sciences would also show themselves more openly aware of the
issues and if they would say more clearly what questions still remain
open.
In this regard, I have always considered exemplary the work of Jacques
Monod, who clearly recognizes that, ultimately, we do not know the ways
by which new DNA full of meaning is formed time and time again. I
contest your thesis on page 129 according to which the four typologies
developed by Darwin would perfectly explain all that regards the
evolution of plants and animals, including man. On the other hand, I
would not omit the fact that in this field there is a lot of science
fiction, I will speak of it elsewhere. Moreover, in his book Prinzip Menschlichkeit
(Hamburg 2007), the medical scientist Joachim Bauer of Freiburg
impressively illustrated the problems of social Darwinism; this too
should not be passed over in silence.
The result of the “Longterm-evolution experiment” of which you speak on
page 121 is by no means comprehensive. The attempted contraction of
time in the final analysis is fictitious, and mutations achieved are of a
modest scope. But most of all, man as the demiurge must constantly
intervene with his contribution — precisely what evolution seeks to
exclude. Furthermore, I find it very important that you still, even in
your “religion,” recognize three “mysteries”: the question regarding the
origin of the universe, that regarding the emergence of life and that
regarding the origin of consciousness of the most highly developed
living beings. Of course, also here you see man as one of the species of
ape and thereby substantively cast doubt on the dignity of man;
however, the emergence of consciousness remains an open question for you
(page 182).
III.
You pointed out to me several times that theology would be science
fiction. In this respect, I marvel that you still consider my book
worthy of such detailed discussion. Allow me to propose four points on
the issue:
It is correct to say that only mathematics is “science” in the
strictest sense of the word, though I learned from you that here, too,
it is necessary to make a further distinction between arithmetic and
geometry. In all the specific areas, the scientific credentials of the
discipline has its own form according to the particularity of its
object. What is essential is that you apply a verifiable method, that
you exclude arbitrariness and that you ensure rationality in their
respective and various modalities.
You should at least recognize that, within the context of history and
philosophical thought, theology has produced lasting results.
An important function of theology is to keep religion tied to reason
and reason to religion. Both roles are of essential importance for
humanity. In my dialogue with Habermas, I have shown that there are
pathologies of religion and — no less dangerous — pathologies of reason.
They both need each other, and keeping them constantly connected is an
important task of theology.
Science fiction exists, however, in the context of many sciences. What
you set forth on the theories about the beginning and the end of the
world in Heisenberg, Schrödinger, etc. I would designate as science
fiction in the best sense: they are visions and anticipations, by which
we seek to attain a true knowledge, but in fact, they are only
imaginations whereby we seek to draw near to the reality. Even within
the theory of evolution, a great style of science fiction exists.
Richard Dawkins’ selfish gene is a classic example of science fiction.
The great Jacques Monod wrote sentences that he himself would certainly
have inserted in his work just as science fiction. I quote: “The
emergence of tetrapod vertebrates ... derives its origin from the fact
that a primitive fish ‘chose’ to go and explore the land, on which,
however, he was unable to move except by hopping awkwardly and thus
creating, as a result of behavioral modification, the selective pressure
thanks to which the sturdy limbs of tetrapods would have developed.
Among the descendants of this daring explorer, of this Magellan of
evolution, some can run at a speed of more than 70 miles per hour ...”
(quoted according to the Italian edition Chance and Necessity, Milan
2001, p. 117ff) .
IV.
All the issues I have discussed thus far have been part of a serious
dialogue, for which, as I’ve said repeatedly, I am grateful. The
situation is quite different in the chapter on the priest and on
Catholic morality, and even more different in the chapter on Jesus. As
for what you say about the moral abuse of minors by priests, I can, as
you know, only note it with deep dismay.
I have never tried to hide
these things. That the power of evil penetrates even to this point in
the interior life of the faith is, for us, a suffering which, on the one
hand, we must endure, while on the other hand, we must at the same time
do everything possible so that cases such as these never occur again.
Nor is it a reason for comfort to know that, according to the research
of sociologists, the percentage of priests guilty of these crimes is not
higher than in those found in other similar professions. In any case,
this deviant behaviour should not be ostensibly presented as a filthy
crime which only exists in the Catholic Church.
If we may not remain silent about evil in the Church, then neither
should we keep silent about the great shining path of goodness and
purity which the Christian faith has traced out over the course of the
centuries. We need to remember the great and pure figures which the
faith has produced — from Benedict of Nursia and his sister Scholastica,
to Francis and Claire of Assisi, to Teresa of Avila and John of the
Cross, to the great saints of charity like Vincent de Paul and Camillo
de Lellis, to Mother Teresa of Calcutta and the great and noble figures
of nineteenth century Turin. It is also true today that faith moves many
people to selfless love, to service to others, to sincerity and to
justice. You cannot know how many forms of selfless assistance to the
suffering are realized through the service of the Church and its
faithful. If you were to take away everything that is done from these
motives, it would cause a far-reaching social collapse. Lastly, neither
should one keep silent regarding the artistic beauty which the faith has
given to the world: nowhere is it better seen than in Italy. Think also
of the music which has been inspired by faith, from Gregorian chant to
Palestrina, Bach, Mozart, Haydn, Beethoven, Bruckner, Brahms, and so on.
V.
What you say about the person of Jesus is not worthy of your scientific
standing. If you are posing the question as if, in the end you knew
nothing about Jesus and as though nothing were ascertainable about Him
as a historic figure, then I could only firmly invite you to become a
little more competent from an historical point of view. For this, I
recommend especially the four volumes which Martin Hengel (an exegete of
the Protestant Theological Faculty of Tübingen) published together with
Maria Schwemer: it is an excellent example of historical precision and
of the broadest historical knowledge. Compared with this, what you say
about Jesus is rash talk that should not be repeated.
It is an incontestable fact that many things of little seriousness have
been written within the field of exegesis. The American seminar on
Jesus you cite on pages 105 and following only confirms again what
Albert Schweitzer had noted about the “Leben-Jesu-Forschung” (Research
on the life of Jesus), i.e. that the so-called “historical Jesus” is for
the most part a reflection of the authors’ ideas. These botched forms
of historical work, however, do not compromise at all the importance of
serious historical research, which has brought us true and certain
knowledge about the proclamation [of the Gospel] and the figure of
Jesus.
On page 104 you go so far as to ask the question if Jesus was perhaps
even one of the many charlatans who seduced innocent people with spells
and tricks. And even if this is only expressed in the form of a question
and, thank God, does not appear as a thesis, respect for what others
hold as a sacred reality should restrain you from such insults (cf. the
expression “silly charlatanism” on page 104).
I must also forcefully reject your assertion (p. 126) that I have
portrayed historical-critical exegesis as an instrument of the
Antichrist. Treating the account of Jesus’ temptations, I have only
taken up Soloviev’s thesis that historical-critical exegesis can also be
used by the antichrist — which is an incontestable fact. At the same
time, however — and especially in the preface to the first volume of my
book on Jesus of Nazareth — I have always explained clearly that
historical-critical exegesis is necessary for a faith that does not
propose myths with historical images, but that it demands genuine
historicity and therefore must present the historical reality of its
claims in a scientific manner. For this reason, neither is it correct
for you to tell me that I would be interested only in meta-history: On
the contrary, all my efforts are aimed at showing that the Jesus
described in the Gospels is also the real historical Jesus, that it is
history which actually occurred.
At this point, I would also like to note that your exposition of the crede ut intellegas does not agree with the Augustinian mode of thinking which guides me: for Augustine crede ut intellegas and intellege ut credas, in their own specific ways, are inseparably joined. In this regard, I would refer you to the article crede ut intellegas by Eugene TeSelle in the “Augustinus-Lexikon" (ed. C. Mayer, vol. 2 Basel from 1996 to 2002, coll. 116-119).
Allow me then to observe that, regarding the scientific nature of
theology and its sources, you should move more cautiously when it comes
to historical statements. I shall mention just one example. On page 109,
you tell us that the changing of water into wine at the Wedding at Cana
in John’s Gospel corresponds to the account of the changing of the Nile
into blood (Exodus 7:17ff). This, of course, is nonsense. The
transformation of the Nile into blood was a scourge that, for some time,
took the vital resource of water from men in order to soften Pharaoh’s
heart. The changing of water into wine at Cana, however, is the gift of
nuptial joy which God offers in abundance to men. It is a reference to
the changing of the water of the Torah into the exquisite wine of the
Gospel. In John’s Gospel, yes, the typology of Moses is present, but not
in this passage.
VI.
In Chapter 19 of your book, we return to the positive aspects of your
dialogue with my book. First, however, allow me to correct another small
mistake on your part. In my book I did not base myself on the
Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed, the text of which, to your praise, you
communicate to the reader, but rather on the “Apostle’s Creed” as it is
called. Its core is founded on the City of Rome’s profession of faith
and then, beginning from the third century, it increasingly spread in
the West with several slight variations. Since the fourth century, it
has been considered as compiled by the Apostles themselves. In the East,
however, it has remained unknown.
But now let us turn to chapter 19 of your book: Even if your
interpretation of John 1:1 is very far from what the evangelist
intended, there is still an important convergence. If, however, you wish
to replace God with “Nature,” the question remains as to who or what
this nature is. Nowhere do you define it and it therefore appears to be
an irrational divinity which explains nothing. However, I would like
especially to note that in your religion of mathematics three
fundamental themes of human existence are not considered: freedom, love
and evil. I am surprised that with a nod you set aside freedom which has
been and still remains a fundamental value of the modern age. Love does
not appear in your book, nor does the question of evil. Whatever
neurobiology says or does not say about freedom, in the real drama of
our history it is present as a crucial reality and it must be taken into
account. However, your mathematical religion knows of no answer to the
question of freedom, it ignores love and it does not give us any
information on evil. A religion that neglects these fundamental
questions is empty.
Distinguished Professor, my critique of your book is, in part, tough.
However, frankness is a part of dialogue. Only thus can knowledge grow.
You have been very frank and so you will accept that I am, too. In any
case, however, I consider it very positive that you, in confronting my Introduction to Christianity,
have sought such an open dialogue with the faith of the Catholic Church
and that, despite its contrasts, at the centre of it all, convergences
are not completely lacking.
With cordial greetings and every best wish in your work,
Benedict XVI
"Deus que criou o homem por amor, também o chamou para o amor, vocação fundamental e inata de todo ser humano.” (CIC 1604)
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